Julia Curlee, a former senior CIA officer, stood before the camera in Washington DC on 25 August 2026, her reflection a stark reminder of the personal cost of political purges. Speaking to the Guardian, she detailed how the Trump administration’s systematic removal of national‑security experts left the government exposed, crippled decision‑making and contributed to a disastrous Iran campaign. Her testimony, backed by a series of precise dates and verifiable events, offers a rare insider view of how ideology can override competence at the highest levels of state.
The Purge Begins
Curlee’s troubles started in March 2025 when the White House informed her that her senior intelligence post was being terminated. Her supervisor’s request was unusual: she was to continue reporting for work, but “discreetly”. The longtime CIA analyst had served under both Donald Trump and Joe Biden, briefing Vice‑President Mike Pence during the first Trump term and later acting as a national‑security director on Biden’s National Security Council. When Trump returned to office in 2024, she chose to stay, despite warnings from superiors that her transgender identity made her a target.
The turning point arrived when she opened her phone and saw a post from far‑right influencer Laura Loomer:
> “SCOOP: A transgender, Biden holdover who hates President Trump is still working in the [National Security Council] intel office,” wrote Laura Loomer. “If you are aware of this person and have their name, please send it to me and I will post their identity.”
Curlee’s response was blunt:
> “If you want to fire me, just fire me. And so he did.”
Although she was officially removed, she returned to the White House the following Monday to wrap up pending tasks, including finalising a budget and briefing colleagues on her portfolio. She noted the bitter irony of being asked to continue sensitive work while her identity was being weaponised against her:
> “It was absolutely not a problem for this administration to rely on and ask a trans woman who they knew was trans to continue serving them in a capacity of great sensitivity at the highest levels, including briefing this president, as long as it was secret.”
Operational Fallout
The purge did not stop with Curlee. On the third day of the new administration, an assistant intercepted her after a briefing with a deputy national security adviser and delivered the chilling news:
> “Everyone’s been fired except for you and me.”
Approximately 160 NSC staffers – career public servants on loan from the CIA, State Department and other agencies – were told not to return to the White House. Curlee described the ensuing chaos as a “dumpster fire”, pointing out that the administration had failed to plan for the sudden loss of expertise. Officials struggled to obtain computer logins, access secure rooms or determine who possessed clearance for the presidential daily brief. At times, she had to withhold information to avoid committing a felony by sharing it with unauthorised personnel.
> “People who are supposed to be running policy, overseeing critical national programs, are unable to get access to information,” she said.
> “It would not have been impossible to imagine that a foreign adversary of the United States would see that as a window of opportunity to do something. And they would have found a government crippled at the senior most level by its own decisions.”
Curlee personally pleaded with several of the dismissed officers to return to help stabilise the Situation Room. Many complied, motivated by a sense of public‑service duty despite the humiliation they had endured. Senior officials repeatedly told her she was “indispensable” – until the moment they no longer did.
Iran Missteps and the Message‑Shooting Effect
Back at the CIA, Curlee watched the consequences of the intelligence vacuum unfold in Iran. She argued that the administration’s missteps were not accidental but foreseeable:
> “Most of what has gone wrong was foreseeable and had been previously assessed as a likely consequence for any war with Iran,” she argued.
> “Traditionally, the NSC would be providing regular briefings for senior officials with warnings about potential outcomes in a war. For Iran, ‘I know the analysis kept going. People tried to do their best. I know many of the officers who work these issues have great integrity, but there’s no sign that information ever reached the president.’”
The lack of coherent planning left the United States without an evacuation plan for roughly half a million Americans residing in the Middle East when hostilities began in February. Moreover, the administration had not prepared for Iran to potentially close the Strait of Hormuz, and its reluctance to consult allies meant that European nations refused to assist when the US later sought help to reopen the waterway.
> “When you tell our allies and partners, we don’t care, we don’t need you and we insult them and their leaders, then we launch the war and it turns out we need their help, it’s the worst possible sequencing,” Curlee said.
She warned that the desire to salve the humiliation of losing to Iran could push the administration toward another conflict, motivated by a need to bolster the president’s ego or satisfy an expansionist impulse, especially in the Western Hemisphere.
Curlee also highlighted a broader pattern of retaliation against intelligence professionals who dared to speak truth to power. In May 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, then Trump’s national intelligence director, fired the two highest‑ranking National Intelligence Council officials after their assessment of a Venezuelan gang contradicted the president’s narrative. A month later, in August 2025, Gabbard removed a senior CIA Russia expert who had contributed to a decade‑old study on Russian election interference.
> “It’s an attack on the messengers,” said Curlee. “You had a purge of a currently serving officer who was one of our best, for simply having had the integrity to speak the truth a decade before … If that person can be purged, what hope do you have if you’re a junior officer?”
The politicisation of intelligence, she argued, went beyond selective use of assessments; it constituted direct reprisal against officers, prompting many to leave government or self‑censor, thereby ensuring that vital messages never reached decision‑makers.
Why it Matters
Curlee’s testimony underscores a stark lesson for any organisation that prizes loyalty over expertise: when a government systematically removes its most knowledgeable officials in pursuit of ideological purity, the resulting blind spots can precipitate costly strategic failures and endanger lives. Her account links the Trump administration’s anti‑trans purges, the erosion of inter‑agency cooperation and the mismanaged Iran campaign to a broader degradation of national‑security competence. For investors, policymakers and corporate leaders watching geopolitical risk, the episode serves as a reminder that the health of a nation’s intelligence apparatus is not a peripheral concern but a core determinant of stability, market confidence and long‑term security. Ignoring that lesson risks repeating the same costly mistakes, with repercussions that could echo for decades.