A decade after the referendum that cleaved British politics in two, the verdict of the public has settled into a durable consensus: leaving the European Union was a mistake. Yet as Prime Minister Andy Burnham signals a willingness to countenance a full reversal, fresh polling reveals a nation still deeply fractured over what comes next — and whether the political class has the mandate, or the mechanism, to turn regret into re-entry.
The Numbers Behind the Narrative
The most striking feature of the latest data is not its volatility but its stability. YouGov’s June survey of 2,114 British adults found that 57 per cent now believe the 2016 decision was wrong, a figure that has hovered above the 50 per cent mark since the summer of 2022 without ever breaching 58 per cent. Only 30 per cent maintain the vote was correct. That gap — 27 points — has become the new baseline of British political reality.
What makes this consistency remarkable is its endurance across a tumultuous half-decade. Support for Leave peaked at 47 per cent in the referendum’s immediate aftermath. It has not topped 40 per cent since early 2022 and touched a floor of 29 per cent this May. In polling terms, the argument for Brexit has not merely lost; it has collapsed into a persistent minority position.
Yet the coalition that delivered the 2016 result has not evaporated. Nearly two-thirds of Leave voters — 64 per cent — still stand by their choice. Almost a quarter, however, have switched sides. Among Remain voters, the conviction is near-total: 89 per cent say the country erred, with a mere 6 per cent dissenting.
Party Lines Drawn in Chalk
The partisan sorting is almost absolute. Eighty per cent of those who backed Reform UK at the 2024 general election still endorse the Leave verdict, as do 56 per cent of Conservative supporters. By contrast, just 13 per cent of Labour voters, 13 per cent of Liberal Democrats and 10 per cent of Greens agree. The mirror image holds for those who believe the UK was wrong to leave: 79 per cent of Labour supporters, 83 per cent of Liberal Democrats and 85 per cent of Greens.
This alignment matters. It means the “Rejoin” question is no longer a cross-cutting issue but a partisan identifier. When Burnham declared this week that he could go “all the way” in proposing a return to the EU — arguing it was “not good enough” to leave the matter “hanging” — he was speaking to his coalition. The risk, of course, is that he hardens the opposition’s resolve without expanding his own.
The Rejoin Question: Framing Changes Everything
Ask the public whether Britain should rejoin the EU in principle, and a majority agrees. YouGov’s latest poll puts support at 55 per cent, opposition at 34 per cent. But introduce the conditions of membership — specifically, the loss of the opt-outs Britain once enjoyed — and the picture inverts. Support collapses to 35 per cent; opposition surges to 43 per cent.
Other pollsters tell slightly different stories, largely because they ask different questions. Opinium, surveying 2,050 adults in late May, found only 36 per cent favoured rejoining outright, though a further 21 per cent wanted a closer relationship short of membership. Ipsos, interviewing 1,137 adults in mid-May, framed the choice as a hypothetical referendum on applying to rejoin. Fifty-two per cent said they would vote yes, 33 per cent no. Among those certain to vote, the yes share rose to 58 per cent.
The discrepancy is not noise. It is signal. Public opinion on Europe is soft, conditional and highly sensitive to the terms on offer. A “principle” question captures sentiment; a “terms” question captures calculation. Any future referendum would be fought on the latter.
A Generational Faultline
Age remains the sharpest demographic divider. Ipsos found 68 per cent of 18- to 34-year-olds would vote to apply for EU membership, compared with 58 per cent of 35- to 54-year-olds and just 37 per cent of those 55 and older. The youngest cohort — those who came of age after the referendum — are the most pro-European. The oldest, who lived through both accession and departure, are the most sceptical.
This generational gradient suggests the political trajectory points in one direction over the long term. But elections are fought in the short term, and the over-55s vote in far higher numbers. Burnham’s calculus must account for that asymmetry.
Why it Matters
The polling reveals a country that has largely made up its mind about the past but remains paralysed about the future. Regret is now the majority position; reversal is not. For a Prime Minister who has staked his authority on a “new path” rejecting four decades of consensus — privatisation, austerity, and Brexit — the data offers both permission and a warning. The public may be ready to hear the case for return. They have not yet been persuaded it is practical, necessary, or worth the cost. Until the political class can answer the “how” as convincingly as the “why”, Britain’s European question will remain exactly where Burnham found it: hanging.