VANCOUVER — The defamation lawsuit that has shadowed Canadian literary circles for years shifted dramatically on Wednesday when lawyers for the woman at the centre of the case confirmed she is no longer asserting that author Steven Galloway sexually assaulted her. Instead, her amended defence states only that she “reported sexual assaults” — a distinction that legal observers say could reshape the trajectory of a trial already heavy with questions about institutional accountability, due process, and the architecture of public reckoning.
The development unfolded on day three of proceedings in British Columbia Supreme Court, where Justice Neena Sharma pressed counsel on the precise boundaries of the defence. What emerged was a careful, consequential recalibration: the complainant, referred to as A.B. under a publication ban, has withdrawn the defence of justification — the legal argument that the allegedly defamatory statements were true — without conceding they were false.
A defence rewritten
Arden Beddoes, representing A.B., told the court his client’s mental health remains “in tatters” and that her engagement with the legal process itself is one basis for the indefinite sealing order shielding her identity. But when Sharma asked directly whether the statement of defence still included an assertion of sexual assault by Galloway, Beddoes answered with a single word: “No.”
The judge appeared unconvinced by the suggestion that withdrawing a truth defence leaves the question of falsity legally inert. “I’m unconvinced … that there’s no difference in a defamation action between the court presuming falsity as a matter of law and making a finding of falsity on the evidence,” Sharma said.
The exchange laid bare a tension that has animated this case since Galloway filed his claim in 2018: the gap between what a court presumes and what it proves. Galloway’s lawyer, Daniel Burnett, argued that a judicial finding of falsity — rather than a mere legal presumption — is essential both to potential damages and to his client’s vindication.
Galloway takes the stand
Earlier in the day, Galloway testified that the alleged assault on his boat in 2011 “never happened” and that A.B.’s “entire story is fictional.” He described being “floored” and “horrified” by emails disclosed during the litigation — correspondence that included a complaint to the president of the University of British Columbia, copied to a journalist at CBC’s The Fifth Estate, depicting him as a violent sexual predator.
The award-winning author of The Cellist of Sarajevo said he never understood why UBC publicly announced his suspension in 2015 over what it termed “serious allegations,” calling the move “verdict first, trial second.” He suggested the university acted under pressure, noting emails in which A.B. allegedly threatened “a big public thing” at a time when the institution was “extremely concerned with their image.”
Galloway, who now works in yacht sales, denied all allegations unequivocally under questioning from Burnett. “Absolutely not,” he replied when asked whether he had raped, sexually assaulted, or physically assaulted A.B.
Institutional echoes
The case has long functioned as a proxy battle over how universities handle sexual violence allegations in the #MeToo era. Galloway’s suspension — and the subsequent $167,000 arbitration award he won against UBC for violations of his privacy and due process rights — sparked fierce debate about procedural fairness, the rights of complainants, and the power of public opinion to pre-empt adjudication.
Multiple defendants originally named in the lawsuit have settled and issued public apologies. Their statements, published across social media and other forums, acknowledged the allegations were unproven. Yet the digital footprint of those claims persists, a reality Galloway’s legal team argues compounds the reputational harm.
Why it Matters
This trial sits at the intersection of defamation law and the broader reckoning with how institutions — universities, media, courts — navigate allegations of sexual violence when the evidentiary threshold for criminal prosecution is not met. The complainant’s strategic amendment raises profound questions: can a plaintiff withdraw a truth defence without conceding falsity, and what does that mean for a defendant seeking not just legal exoneration but public vindication? For Galloway, whose career was dismantled by allegations that never reached a criminal court, the distinction between a legal presumption and a judicial finding may determine whether he reclaims his reputation — or remains suspended in a limbo where accusation alone was sentence enough.
