Twenty‑five years after the al‑Qaeda strikes on New York and Washington, Islamist militancy in Africa’s Sahel belt is heading for a historic peak. Data compiled by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (Acled) show that violent incidents involving jihadist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have risen from a mere 63 in 2016 to 2,845 in 2025, with 2,145 events already logged this year. If the current trajectory continues, the annual total will comfortably exceed 3,000. The United Nations’ Global Peace Index recorded more than 9,000 deaths from security incidents across the three countries in 2025, underscoring the region’s shift from peripheral concern to the epicentre of global terror.
Surge in Sahel jihadist violence
Acled’s figures reveal a stark escalation. In 2016 the Sahel registered only a handful of jihadist‑linked events; by 2025 the count had jumped forty‑fold. The first nine months of 2026 alone have already produced over two‑thirds of last year’s total, signalling that 2026 could become the worst year on record for militant activity in the zone. Analysts note that the increase is not merely statistical; it reflects a deeper entrenchment of groups such as Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) across vast swathes of territory.
Mali’s shifting battlefield
A joint offensive launched in April by JNIM and the Tuareg‑dominated Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) illustrated the volatility on the ground. The coordinated assault targeted government installations, Russian mercenaries and key transport hubs, employing ambushes, car bombs, drones and raids. Mali’s defence minister was killed in a suicide strike on his residence in Kati, while the head of military intelligence also fell. The offensive resulted in the seizure of Kidal, a former FLA stronghold, after government troops withdrew and Russian contractors surrendered. Since then, JNIM has continued to expand its control, inflicting further casualties on both state forces and foreign fighters, and probing neighbouring countries for new fronts.
Regional ripple effects
Beyond Mali, JNIM’s influence is creeping toward the capitals of Burkina Faso and Niger. In Burkina Faso the group claimed responsibility for more than 130 attacks in 2026, striking ever closer to Ouagadougou. Niger, meanwhile, has seen at least 17 JNIM‑attributed incidents, although ISGS remains the dominant jihadist force there. Farther afield, al‑Shabaab continues to exact a heavy toll in Somalia, with Acled recording over 10,000 deaths linked to the group in the last eighteen months. Meanwhile, the Yemen‑based al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has witnessed a roughly 70 % drop in activity, underscoring the geographic shift of militant energy toward the African continent.
Leadership vacuum and global implications
The absence of a clear successor to Ayman al‑Zawahiri, who was killed by a US strike in Kabul in 2022, has left al‑Qaeda’s senior leadership fragmented. Analysts such as Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer foundation suggest that Saif al‑Adel, long believed to be residing in Iran, is the de facto figurehead, though he has yet to issue any public statement. Experts observe that, unlike the early 2000s when al‑Qaeda’s ambitions were fixed on striking the West, the organisation’s current focus is largely regional, with its affiliates consolidating power in Africa while external plots remain unproven.
Why it Matters
The Sahel’s transformation into the world’s most active jihadist theatre threatens to destabilise already fragile states, disrupt humanitarian aid flows and migrant routes, and provide a breeding ground for trans‑national criminal networks. As militant groups carve out territorial control and exploit local grievances, the risk of spill‑over into neighbouring regions—and potentially beyond—grows, demanding urgent attention from policymakers, peace‑keeping missions and international donors alike.
