The Conservative Party’s annual gathering in Birmingham has been marked by an unusually upbeat tone, with senior figures—including leader Kemi Badenoch—publicly musing about the possibility of winning the next general election outright. Yet beneath the optimism lies a stark reality: recent polls suggest the Tories would fare worse than their 2024 defeat if a vote were held today, and the party still lags behind both Reform UK and Labour. The conference’s mood reflects a blend of personal charisma, strategic repositioning and a gamble on tactical voting, all of which will shape the contest ahead.
From defeat to defiance: the conference’s contrasting narratives
After a decisive loss in 2024, the Tories have spent the past year nursing bruised pride and grappling with internal divisions. Polling data quoted by several commentators indicates that the party would perform even more poorly than its 2024 showing were an election imminent. Nevertheless, the annual conference has been punctuated by declarations of confidence. “We are preparing for an election now,” deputy leader Alex Burghart told a fringe meeting, adding that the party is “convinced we can win the election outright.” The juxtaposition of these statements with the bleak poll numbers illustrates the party’s attempt to reframe its narrative, turning perceived weakness into a rallying cry for renewal.
Badenoch’s personal brand and its limits
Kemi Badenoch’s approval ratings have surged in recent months, positioning her alongside Prime Minister Andy Burnham as one of the few leaders with a net positive rating, according to the pollsters More In Common. In a packed fringe session, Luke Tryl of More In Common described the Tory leader as a “breath of fresh air” and highlighted focus‑group comments that she is unafraid to “say it as it is.” Her performances during Prime Minister’s Questions have been praised as “intelligent,” “professional” and “principled.” This personal appeal, however, has not yet translated into broader party support. Focus‑group feedback still paints the Conservatives as “outdated” and “divided,” suggesting that Badenoch’s charisma alone cannot overcome deep‑seated voter mistrust.
The party’s chairman, Kevin Hollinrake, acknowledged this disconnect at the same meeting, noting that “people do trust Kemi and they don’t trust us.” He framed this as a foundation upon which the party can build, hinting that the leadership’s personal popularity could be leveraged to rehabilitate the broader brand. Yet analysts warn that such reliance on a single figure risks leaving the party vulnerable if her popularity wanes.
Policy pivot and electoral arithmetic
Badenoch has sought to distance the Tories from the culture‑war rhetoric that characterised previous administrations, opting instead for a hard focus on the economy and a return to “old‑school Conservatism.” She has ruled out any formal alliance with Reform UK in the event of a hung parliament, telling the BBC that she would prefer another election to a deal. This stance is designed to appeal to centrist voters who might otherwise be deterred by associations with a more radical right‑wing partner.
The party’s fiscal plans also reflect a shift toward more conventional messaging. A recent pledge to allocate £10 billion to Britain’s anti‑missile defence system and a shadow chancellor’s vow to cut at least one tax in every Tory budget aim to showcase competence and economic stewardship. While these proposals are intended to signal readiness for government, they also expose the Tories to scrutiny over how such spending would be financed after years of fiscal constraints.
Internally, the conference heard claims that unity has improved markedly, with Hollinrake asserting that the party is “more united than at any time in their recent history, with the possible exception of the aftermath of Boris Johnson’s 2019 victory.” Such declarations are countered by polling that places the Tories four to five points behind Reform UK and as much as nine points behind Labour, underscoring the gap between internal perception and external reality.
Tactical voting and the path to the “top two”
Former Scottish Conservative leader Dame Ruth Davidson highlighted a strategic imperative: the Tories must become one of the “top two” parties if they are to attract voters who are primarily motivated by removing Labour from power. She argued that once the Conservatives secure that status, “voters who want to see the back of Labour would start moving to the Tories in serious numbers.” This reflects a broader shift toward tactical voting, where electorates may prioritise preventing an undesirable outcome over supporting a preferred party.
Hollinrake’s claim that the Tories are now “the least hated political party in the country” was met with laughter and applause, but it also underscores a pragmatic calculation: if a party can position itself as the lesser evil, it may capture enough tactical votes to overcome its traditional deficits. The party’s messaging increasingly leans on this premise, emphasising that a vote for Labour would be a vote to keep Jeremy Corbyn‑style policies in place, while a vote for Reform could fragment the right‑wing electorate.
The conference’s final sessions reinforced the idea that timing will be critical. While senior figures express confidence in an outright victory, they also acknowledge that the party would prefer to delay an election, with Hollinrake noting, “We are not where we need to be right now. We don’t want an election right now, ideally. Ideally, it would come way down the track.” This tension between aspiration and readiness illustrates the delicate balance the Tories must strike between building momentum and avoiding premature exposure to voter fatigue.
Why it Matters
The Tories’ ability to translate Badenoch’s personal popularity and their policy rebranding into electoral success will shape the UK’s political landscape for the next parliamentary term. If the party can bridge the trust gap, unify a fractured right‑wing electorate and capture enough tactical votes, it could emerge as a viable alternative to Labour and Reform UK. Conversely, failure to close the polling deficit may cement a period of Labour dominance, limiting the scope for Conservative influence on key domestic and defence issues. The outcome of this internal recalibration will therefore have far‑reaching implications for British governance, fiscal policy and the broader balance of power in Westminster.
